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HOWELLS, INC., 
a corporation, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM NELSON, a/k/a 
WILLIAM LORD ASSOCIATES, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 14,829 
This is an action by the plaintiff to collect the sum 
of $2,852.66 owed by the defendant and to hold defendant 
William Nelson personally liable for the debt. Plaintiff 
also claims attorney's fees because the defendant gave the 
plaintiff an insufficient funds check on the account in the 
amount of $2,164.19. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On September 1, 1976, the case was tried without a jury 
before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge. The Court 
awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against 
William Lord Corporation, doing business as William Lord 
Associates. 
Appellant is attempting to appeal from the judgment of 
the trial Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a dismissal of the appeal of the 
appellant, or in the alternative, an affirmance of the 
judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent disagrees with several of the facts stated 
by the appellant and believes that the facts so stated are 
incomplete. 
On February 5, 1976, a check was issued to Howells, 
Inc., on the account of William Lord Associates, and over 
the signature of William H. Nelson. The check was in the 
amount of $2,164.19. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). Judgment of 
$2,852.66 was entered on stipulation of the parties, that 
being the total amount due on the account of the defendant. 
When defendant, William Nelson, delivered the check to 
the plaintiff's offices, he had a conversation with the 
Secretary-Treasurer and credit manager, Ettie Mosher. Mr. 
Nelson requested Mr. Mosher to hold the check for two weeks 
until he had made a bank deposit. (R. 10, 13). The check 
was presented to the bank on February 26, 1976, after which 
it was returned to the plaintiff unpaid by reason of in-
sufficient funds in the account of "William Lord Associates". 
The check was again submitted on approximately March 2, 
1976, and was again returned unpaid. 
At trial it was shown that there was no corporation 
"William Lord Associates", nor had a certificate of doing 
business under an assumed name been filed with the Secretary 
-2-
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of State. It was, however, agreed by the parties and found 
by the Court that William Lord Corporation was doing busi-
ness as William Lord Associates, William Lord Corporation 
being a duly incorporated corporation in the State of Utah. 
Plaintiff claimed that since defendant knew at the time 
of the issuance of the check that there were insufficient 
funds, Utah Code Annotated 7-15-1 and 2, make defendant 
William Nelson personally liable, entitle plaintiff to 
attorney's fees. 
The trial court found that because the check had been 
given to the plaintiff by the defendant with a request to 
hold it for two weeks before depositing it, the check was a 
promissory note and not a check within the meaning of Utah 
Code Annotated 7-15-1. Consequently, at the close of trial 
on September l, 1976, the Court awarded judgment in the 
amount of $2,164.19 against William Lord Corporation. (R. 2 4) • 
On September 14, 1976, counsel for plaintiff submitted 
to the Court a Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. On September 16, 1976, the Court signed the Judg-
ment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but 
the Judgment erroneously awarded judgment against "William 
Nelson, Inc.", instead of William Lord Corporation. (R. 36, 
37, 38-40). Consequently, on September 21, 1976, the defen-
dant filed a "Motion to Conform Judgment to the Proof or in 
Lieu thereof, Motion for New Trial". (R. 33-34). The 
defendant pointed out to the Court that Judgment had been 
erroneously entered against William Nelson Inc., a corpora-
-3-
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tion instead of William Lord Corporation. Defendant asked 
that in the event the Judgment was not modified to conform 
to the proof, then a new trial should be granted, since the 
Judgment entered was not supported by any evidence. Counsel 
for plaintiff filed no response to the Motion and on October 
14, 1976, the Court granted defendant's motion to Conform 
Judgment to the proof and ordered counsel for the defendant 
to prepare an appropriate amended judgment. {R. 32). 
On October 20, 1976, counsel for plaintiff filed a 
Notice of Appeal, appealing to this Court from the "Judgment" 
of the trial court entered on the 16th day of September, 
1976. The Notice of Appeal was dated September 22, 1976, 
but was, in fact, not mailed to the defendant until October 
12, and not filed with the clerk until October 20. On 
October 21, the Court signed the Amended Judgment and the 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Amended 
Judgment awarded judgment to the plaintiff against William 
Lord Corporation in the amount of $2,852.66, and awarded 
plaintiff no attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff did not amend its Notice of Appeal to include 
the Amended Judgment nor did it file a subsequent Notice of 
Appeal. As the case now stands, the plaintiff has appealed 
from the original judgment entered by the Court but has not 
appealed from the amended judgment. It should be remembered 
that the original judgment granted judgment against William 
Nelson, Inc., a corporation. William Nelson, Inc., is not 
named as a defendant in this action, nor was that term ever 
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used by anyone prior to its inclusion in the judgment 
prepared by counsel for plaintiff. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS APPEAL. 
Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal states that it is appealing 
from the judgment of the trial court entered on the 16th day 
of September 1976. (R. 31). 
Plaintiff made no attempt to amend its notice of appeal 
or file a new notice of appeal when judgment was entered on 
October 21, 1976. As a result, plaintiff appeals from a 
judgment which has been rendered null and void by an_ amend-
ment, thereby making plaintiff's appeal moot. 
Appellant has completely failed to recognize the 
amended judgment, never mentions the amended judgment in its 
brief, and is apparently unconcerned about it. 
While respondent realizes that defects in appellant 
procedure are subject to waiver, U.R.C.P. 73, State v. Good, 
9 Ariz.App. 388, 452 P.2d 715 (1960); that the object of a 
notice of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an 
appeal has been taken, Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate Inc., 
15 Utah2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964); and that rules and 
statutes implementing the right of appeal are liberally 
construed and applied in the furtherance of justice, Wood 
v. Turner, 18 Utah2d 229, 419 P.2d 634 (1966); in the present 
case there is a technical defect in the appellate instruments 
of the plaintiff which this Court cannot correct. 
Respondent submits that the case of Nunley v. Stan Katz 
-5-
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Real Estate Inc., supra, while different in fact is correct 
in principle and binding in the present case. 
In Nunley, a judgment was entered and 11 days later 
motions for a new trial and to amend the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were filed. The trial court heard 
the motions and granted an amendment to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and a judgment was subsequently 
entered. Defendant appealed from the subsequent judgment. 
In deciding the case, this court was "initially faced 
with a procedural question, i.e., whether this Court can act 
on an appeal from an admittedly void judgment." It was 
determined that the subsequent judgment was void because the 
motion for a new trial and to amend the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was filed too late for the lower court to 
act. Appellant claimed that the notice of appeal, while 
designating the subsequent judgment, was a clerical error 
and should have designated the prior judgment which appeal 
would then have been timely, since it would have been within 
the thirty day period. 
This Court in Nunley determined that there would be no 
problem if it were faced with only one judgment appealed 
from, but in fact, there were two judgments. In deciding 
the case, the Court stated: 
Respondent is entitled to know speci-
fically which judgment is being ap-
pealed. The second judgment being 
different from the first, and in ad-
dition, void takes this case from the 
realm of a mere clerical error as was 
evidentally made in the Price case. 
The date becomes material in this 
-6-
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instance and we are not inclined to 
correct appellant's error. Nunley, 
supra, at BOO. 
The Court in Nunley concluded that an appeal cannot be 
taken from a void judgment. While the fact situation was 
essentially backwards from that in the present case, the 
same principles apply. Plaintiff appeals from a void judg-
ment, thereby depriving this Court of jurisdiction to hear 
the matter. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT AWARDING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO PLAINTIFF. 
As stated above, Judgment of the trial court awarded 
judgment against William Lord Corporation of $2,852.66 and 
costs in the amount of $25.00, but denied judgment against 
defendant William Nelson personally and awarded plaintiff no 
attorney's fees. 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Annotated §7-15-1 and 
2 entitle it to attorney's fees in this action. In order to 
make U.C.A. §7-15-1 applicable, the following elements must 
be established: 
1. The person must willfully, with intent to defraud 
draw any check, draft or order, and 
2. The document must in fact be a check, draft, or 
order. 
These two elements have not been established by the appellant. 
First, the instrument signed by Mr. Nelson and given to 
the plaintiff was essentially a post dated check and there-
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fore, a promissory note. It is undisputed that at the time 
of the transfer of the document, plaintiff's agent was 
informed that the check should not be deposited for a period 
of two weeks since there would be insufficient funds to 
cover the check during that time. (R. 10, 13). In State 
v. Bruce, 1 Utah2d 136, 262 P.2d 960 (1953), this Court, 
in a criminal case, held that a post dated check could not 
be used in a conviction for criminal fraud. The Court 
stated at 962: 
The portions of our statute relating to 
bogus checks, material to the present inquiry, 
are: 
"Any person who * * * wilfully, with 
intent to defraud, makes * * or de-
livers any check, * * * knowing at 
the time * * * that the maker * * * 
has not sufficient funds in, or credit 
with said bank * * for the payment of 
such check * * * is punishable * * * 
"The making, * * * or delivering of 
such check, * * * shall be prima 
facie evidence of intent to defraud." 
(Emphasis added) . 
The emphasized words indicate that the 
statute denounces the passing of a bad check 
only where there is misrepresentation that the 
maker has money or credit at the time the bad 
check is passed. It logically follows that it 
does not apply when both maker and payee know 
that the check is postdated. Under such cir-
cumstances the clear inference is that the 
maker has not money to pay the check at the 
time, but intends to cover it by the postdate. 
Where the payee accepts it with that under-
standing, he is not relying on a represen-
tation that the maker has money in the bank 
at the time, but rather that it will be cov-
ered when it is presented on its date. This 
amounts to a promise to be performed in ~ 
future. Obviously such a promise may be made 
in good faith, but plans go awry, unexpected 
-8-
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or uncontrollable events intervene, or a 
bona fide change of mind occurs, any one of 
which would negative the existence of an in-
tent to defraud at the time the check was 
passed, thus eliminating an element essen-
tial to constitute the crime. Such reasoning 
is the basis of the general rule that a pro-
mise of performance in the future will 
usually not support a charge of fraud. We so 
held with respect to a postdated check in the 
case of State v. Trogstad. (Emphasis added). 
For additional cases holding that acceptance of a 
postdated check or one wherein the drawer indicates that the 
check should be held for a period of time because of in-
sufficient funds, is equivalent to an extension of credit; 
see Seaboard Oil Company v. Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321, cert. 
den. 284 U.S. 657, 76 L.Ed. 557, 52 S.Ct. 35 (1931); People v. 
Poyett, 99 Cal.Rptr. 750, 492 P.2d 1150 (1972); People v. Meller, 
185 Colo. 389, 524 P.2d 1366 (1974); State v. Eikleberger, 
72 Idaho 245, 239 P.2d 1069 (1951); People v. Mazeloff, 229 
App.Div. 451, 242 N.Y.S. 623 (1930). 
The above authorities clearly indicate that a check 
given with a representation that there are presently in-
sufficient funds to cover the check and that it should be 
held for a number of days proscribe the application of 
U.C.A. §7-15-1 since the transaction becomes an extension of 
credit. 
In addition, the document signed by William Nelson does 
not constitute a "check" within the meaning of U.C.A. §70A-
3-104. That section defines a check as a "draft drawn on a 
bank and payable on demand". This same section states that 
to be a negotiable instrument, an instrument is either 
-9-
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"payable on demand or at a definite time". Since the in-
strwnent in the present case was not payable on demand but 
was payable at a definite time, it was not a check as de-
fined in this section and the only other applicable de-
finition is that of a "note". 
Utah Code Annotated §70A-3-109, defines "definite time" 
as "payable or before a stated date or at a fixed period 
after a stated date". 
In the present case, the instrwnent negotiated by 
defendant William Nelson was not a "check" as defined by the 
Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore, appellant failed to 
establish an essential element required by U.C.A. §7-15-1. 
The second element essential for a .claim under U.C.A. 
§7-15-1 is also lacking, that of willful intent to defraud 
at the time of the making of the instrwnent. 
As previously stated, it is undisputed that the Secretary-
Treasurer for the plaintiff accepted the check on the repre-
sentation by the defendant that it was to be held for two 
weeks until such time that he could deposit funds in the 
account. 
Essentially the same fact situation occurred in State v. 
Trogstad, 98 Utah 565, 100 P.2d 564 (1940), except that it 
involved a criminal prosecution. In that case, this Court 
ruled at 566: 
The statute provides that there 
must be proved (a) an intent to defraud, 
and (b) a knowledge that the maker or 
drawer did not have (1) sufficient funds 
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or l21 credit with the bank for payment. 
The essence of the charge is that the in-
jured party must have relied upon some 
false and deceitful pretense. The check 
must have been drawn, uttered or delivered 
willfully and with the intent to defraud 
and knowing there was neither sufficient 
funds nor credit with the firm or person 
upon whom it was drawn. 
The specific intent to defraud must 
be found from the evidence. Such intent 
must be shown to exist in the mind of the 
maker or drawer. Intent may be found from 
the circumstances. Reliance by the re-
ceiver of the check, draft or order upon 
the representations made at the time of 
the transaction and damage resulting there-
from are elements of the fraud. If the 
receiver accepted the check, draft or order 
as evidence of a loan, an essential element 
of fraud would be wanting. In the instant 
case, there is evidence that the trans-
action was one between a borrower and a len-
der. 
Mrs. Frakes knew that there were no 
funds available for payment of the check 
immediately, when she received the $300 
check, but that it was to be held for a few 
days until it was good. This is in accord 
with Mrs. Frake's own testimony. She held 
it for some time and tried to collect upon 
it. In other words, Mrs. Frakes treated 
the check as a promise to pay in the future, 
rather than as a check. This rebuts any 
idea that the check was delivered as a 
check with intent to defraud.(Emphasis 
added) . 
While U.C.A. §7-15-2 includes a presumption of fraud, 
if there are insufficient funds when the check is drawn or 
presented, that presumption is rebutted if the payee accepts 
the check as a promise to pay and not as a negotiable instru-
ment. That was exacly the situation in State v. Trogstad 
and in the present case. See also Meller, supra; In Re Griffin, 
83 Cal.Appl. 779, 257 P.2d 458 (1927); and People v. Burnett, 
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39 Cal.2d 556, 247 P.2d 828, 1952. 
In the present case the appellant failed to prove that 
the document accepted was a check, was accepted as a check 
by the plaintiff's agent, or that at the time of the accep-
tance the defendant had the intent to defraud the plaintiff. 
POINT III 
DEFANDANT WILLIAM NELSON IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE 
ON THE JUDGMENT IN THE PRESENT CASE. 
Appellant contends that Defendant William Nelson, since 
he signed the check in question, is personally liable for 
the amount of the check. The trial court found that William 
Lord Associates was an assumed name for William Lord Corporation, 
and since the defendant was an officer for that corporation, 
he had no personal liability when he signed the document. 
Appellant contends that since the defendant failed to 
comply with the assumed name statute, U.C.A. §42-2-5, defendant 
William Nelson is personally liable for the check. What 
appellant fails to realize is that the assumed name statute 
merely precludes the. filing of a lawsuit by one who has 
failed to properly register. 
Penalties. Any person or persons who 
shall carry one, conduct or transact any 
such subiness under an assumed name with-
out having complied with the provisions 
of this act, shall not sue, prosecute or 
maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, 
cross-complaint or preceeding in any of 
the courts of this state until the pro-
visions of this chapter have been com-
plied with, and any such person or per-
sons so failing to comply shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor. U.C.A. §42-2-10. 
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There is nothing in the assumed name statute nor in the 
provisions relating to corporations which makes an indivi-
dual officer of the corporation liable for failure of the 
corporation to register for doing business under an assumed 
name. 
Appellant's attempt to place liability on Mr. Nelson 
through case law is equally misplaced. All of the cases 
cited by appellant involve an officer or director who knew 
that there were insufficient funds at the time the check was 
written but failed to inform the other party thereby will-
fully defrauding the payee. In the present case, there was 
no fraud, and therefore, there can be no imposition of 
liability upon defendant William Nelson. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's appeal is defective, and consequently, this 
Court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
If the Court does consider the matter, the appellant 
has nevertheless failed to establish that at the time the 
document was issued by William Lord Associates, that there 
was an intent to defraud the plaintiff, and consequently, 
the document does not constitute a check and further, defen-
dant William Nelson cannot be personally liable for its 
issuance. 
Respondent respectfully requests the Court to dismiss 
the appeal, or in the alternative, to affirm the judgment of 
the trial court. 
DATED this ~day of February, 1977. 
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for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PET 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief to Dale R. Kent, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, Suite 100 Commercial Club, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of February, 1977. 
Yn~Mf 'f41~ 
secretary 
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